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 On the Algebra in Boole’s Laws of Thought 
 
Subhash Kak 
 
Abstract. This article explores the ideas that went into George Boole’s development of an 
algebra for logic in his book The Laws of Thought. The many theories that have been proposed 
to explain the origins of his algebra have ignored his wife Mary Boole’s claim that he was deeply 
influenced by Indian logic. This paper investigates this claim and argues that Boole’s focus was 
more than a framework for propositions and that he was trying to mathematize cognitions as is 
assumed in Indian logic and to achieve this he believed an algebraic approach was the most 
reasonable. By exploring parallels between his work and Indian logic, we are able to explain 
several peculiarities of his algebraic system.  
  
Introduction 
There is continuing interest in the antecedents to George Boole’s The Laws of Thought [1] and 
an ongoing discussion on how he created a system in which the algebraic and logical calculi are 
not in perfect accord [2]. The sum and difference operations that Boole denotes by + and − are 
neither the standard set-theoretical union (between arbitrary sets) nor the set-theoretical 
difference.  
 
The discrepancy between algebra and logic seen in Boole’s system is problematic given that it 
was a period where these questions were much in discussion and his friend Augustus De 
Morgan (1806-1871) had also presented a formal framework for logic [3][4]. Boole (1815-1864) 
was the younger colleague of De Morgan, and the two of them carried on an extensive 
correspondence for years that was only published in 1982 [5].  However, this correspondence, 
which was only published in 1982, shows they ignored each other’s work suggesting that they 
were still in the process of developing their ideas and they saw their work as somewhat 
tentative. 
 
Another interesting perspective related to Boole’s work is provided by his wife Mary Boole 
(1832-1916), who, during her times, was a well-known writer on mathematical subjects.  She 
claims [6] that her husband as well as De Morgan and Charles Babbage were influenced deeply 
by Indian logic and her uncle George Everest (1790-1866), who lived for a long time in India and 
whose name was eventually given to the world’s highest peak, was the intermediary of these 
ideas. She adds [6]: “Think what must have been the effect of the intense Hinduizing of three 
such men as Babbage, De Morgan, and George Boole on the mathematical atmosphere of 
1830–65,” further speculating that these ideas also influenced the development of vector 
analysis and modern mathematics. Although the statement of Mary Boole is well known, I know 
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of no scholarly study that has attempted to explore the question of the Influence of Indian logic 
on Boole’s work. 
 
So let’s follow the line of thought that arises from Mary Boole’s claim. An account of Indian 
logic was presented by the Sanskritist H.T. Colebrooke at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic 
Society 1824 and it was widely discussed in the scholarly world. Robert Blakely had a chapter on 
“Eastern and Indian Logic” in his 1851 book titled Historical Sketch of Logic in which he 
suggested that this knowledge has “been brought prominently forward among European 
literati” [7]. De Morgan admitted to the significance of Indian logic in his book published in 
1860: “The two races which have founded the mathematics, those of the Sanscrit [an 
alternative early spelling of “Sanskrit”] and Greek languages, have been the two which have 
independently formed systems of logic” [8].   One must therefore accept the correctness of 
Mary Boole’s statement that De Morgan, George Boole and Babbage were cognizant of Indian 
logic even though George Boole does not mention Indian logic texts or the larger Indian 
tradition in his book. We must ascribe this to the fact that while per Mary Boole’s claim, George 
Boole and others knew of Indian logic, they were apparently not knowledgeable of its details 
since only a few of the Sanskrit logic texts had by then been translated into English. 
 
This paper examines the question of Indian influence and tries to estimate what aspects of 
Indian logic are likely to have played a role in the ideas of George Boole. Although scholars are 
agreed that Indian logic had reached full elaboration, it was expressed in a special technical 
language that is not easily converted into the modern symbolic form. Boole most definitely was 
aware of the general scope of Indian logic and known that its focus was the cognition 
underlying the logical operation and this is something he aimed in his own work. He was trying 
to mathematize the role of the cognition and he believed that algebra would be effective for 
this purpose. To the extent he was attempting to go beyond what he knew of Indian logic, he 
thought he could do so by using mathematics. 
 
Boole’s algebra 
Boole’s starting point was algebra with variables like x and y, and algebraic operations such as 
addition and multiplication. He wished to show that algebra had in it the potential to extend 
the applicability of logic as well as the capacity to handle an arbitrary number of propositions. 
This is how he put it in his Laws of Thought [1]: 
 
There is not only a close analogy between the operations of the mind in general reasoning and 
its operations in the particular science of Algebra, but there is to a considerable extent an exact 
agreement in the laws by which the two classes of operations are conducted. Of course the laws 
must in both cases be determined independently; any formal agreement between them can 
only be established `a posteriori by actual comparison. To borrow the notation of the science of 
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Number, and then assume that in its new application the laws by which its use is governed will 
remain unchanged, would be mere hypothesis. There exist, indeed, certain general principles 
founded in the very nature of language, by which the use of symbols, which are but the 
elements of scientific language, is determined. [Section 6 of Chapter 1] 
 
Boole’s algebra is about classes. He says: “That the business of Logic is with the relations of 
classes, and with the modes in which the mind contemplates those relations.” [9] He represents 
the universe of conceivable objects by 1 or unity. Given the objects which are Xs, he calls the 
class by the same symbol X, and he means by the variable x “an elective symbol, which 
represents the mental operation of selecting [my emphasis] from that group all the Xs which it 
contains, or of fixing the attention upon the Xs to the exclusion of all which are not Xs” [9].   
 
In my view, this emphasis on the “mental operation of selection” is the key to his scheme for it 
enlarges the setting to a much bigger system than the “universe of discourse” (a concept 
generally attributed to De Morgan but used as a phrase for the first time in The Laws of 
Thought). 
 
Given two classes X and Y, Boole wrote: 
x = the class X, 
y = the class Y, 
xy = the class each member of which is both X and Y, and so on. 
 
Since selecting objects from the same class leaves the class unchanged, one can write: 
 
 xx =x2=x 
 
In like manner he took 
 
1 - x = the class not-X        (1) 
1 - y = the class not-Y        (2) 
x(1 - y) = the class whose members are Xs but not-Ys   (3) 
(1 - x)(1 - y) = the class whose members are neither Xs nor Ys  (4) 
 
Furthermore, from consideration of the nature of the mental operation involved, he showed 
that the following laws are satisfied: 
 
𝑥𝑥(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 + 𝑥𝑥𝑧𝑧        (5) 
             𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥            (6) 
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             𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥            (7) 
    
From the first of these it is seen that elective symbols are distributive in their operation; from 
the second that they are commutative. The third he termed the index law, the heart of his 
system, which he believed deals with the election (or choosing) that constitutes the process of 
logical inference.  
 
He concluded: “The truth of these laws does not at all depend upon the nature, or the number, 
or the mutual relations, of the individuals included in the different classes. There may be but 
one individual in a class, or there may be a thousand. There may be individuals common to 
different classes, or the classes may be mutually exclusive. All elective symbols are distributive, 
and commutative, and all elective symbols satisfy the law expressed by (7).”[9] 
 
Given n classes x, y, z, … the universe can be partitioned into 2n regions where the classes come 
together in different ways.   
 
With a single class, you have only two sets the class X and its complement, the class “not X” 
which was represented by Boole as (1-x). 
 
1 = x + (1 − x)         (8) 
 
For two classes, X and Y, we have the situation in equation (9) or, equivalently, in Figure 1: 
 
1 = xy + x(1 − y) + (1 − x)y + (1 − x)(1 − y)      (9) 
 
 
              
 Figure 1. Four exclusive sets generated by classes X and Y (eqn. 9) 
 
For three classes, X,Y, and Z, the situation is given by equation (10): 
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1 = xyz + xy(1 − z) + x(1 − y)z + (1 − x)yz + x(1 − y)(1 − z) + (1 − x)y(1 − z) + (1 − x)(1 − y)z + 
(1 − x)(1 − y)(1 − x)       (10) 
 
This is shown in Figure 2 below, where the region 1 is xyz; region 2 is xy(1-z) and so on. 
 
 Figure 2. Division of the universe into 3 classes 
 
Boole's system does not constitute what we know now as Boolean algebra, being different in 
fundamental ways.  Boole's algebra X+Y cannot be interpreted by set union because (X+Y)2 is 
not equal to (X+Y) as required by the condition (7): 
 (𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦)2 = 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑦𝑦2 + 2𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦 + 2𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦  
 
This is equal to (x+y) only under the restrictive condition that x and y are mutually exclusive.  
 
Likewise, (x-y) is not a proper set since 
 (𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦)2 = 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑦𝑦2 − 2𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦 − 2𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 
 
This is equal to (x-y) only under the condition that y is a subset of x, or xy =y. These two 
restrictive conditions are not consistent so Boole’s algebra cannot be used in an effective 
manner for classes except to define subclasses as in (8) though (10).   
 
What we now know as Boolean algebra is different from Boole’s algebra, and why it works to 
the extent it does including division by 0 is now well understood [10]; Boolean algebra as we 
know was developed by Boole's successors (e.g. [11],[12]).  
 
Boole speaks to the deeper foundations of logic in the concluding chapter of The Laws of 
Thought:  
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[A]n evidence that the particular principle or formula in question is founded upon some general 
law or laws of the mind, and an illustration of the doctrine that the perception of such general 
truths is not derived from an induction from many instances, but is involved in the clear 
apprehension of a single instance. .. As in the pure abstractions of Geometry, so in the domain 
of Logic it is seen, that the empire of Truth is, in a certain sense, larger than that of Imagination. 
And as there are many special departments of knowledge which can only be completely 
surveyed from an external point, so the theory of the intellectual processes, as applied only to 
finite objects, seems to involve the recognition of a sphere of thought from which all limits are 
withdrawn.[1] 
 
By this he means that a study of logic is likely to bring one closer to the domain of the mind that 
is informed by a deeper “infinite” truth. This is where intuitions of number and consequently of 
algebra were to be the bedrock of higher structures. This is why he was willing to use variables 
that were not immediately meaningful, for he believed they had the capacity to go beyond 
standard syllogisms.  
 
Indian logic: Nyāya and Navya Nyāya  
Let’s now talk briefly of Indian logic (Nyāya), which has had a long history [13][14] that goes 
back to about 500 BCE. The stated goal in Nyāya is to state essential nature (svarūpa) that 
distinguishes the object from others. The fallacies of definition are that it is too broad, too 
narrow, or just impossible. There is also an old tradition that Greek and Indian logics are related 
[15] and that Kallisthenes, who was in Alexander's party, took logic texts from India and the 
beginning of the Greek tradition of logic must be seen in this material, but this is an issue that 
doesn’t concern us here.  
 
In Indian logic, minds are not empty slates; the very constitution of the mind provides some 
knowledge of the nature of the world. The four pramāṇas through which correct knowledge is 
acquired are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), and testimony 
(śabda). 
 
Navya-Nyāya is a medieval elaboration of Indian logic [16][17]. It was founded by Udayana (c. 
1050 CE), and further developed by Gaṅgeśa (c. 1200 CE), reaching its culmination in the works 
of Raghunātha (c. 1500 CE), Jagadīśa (c. 1600 CE) and Gadādhara (c. 1650 CE). The school 
developed a highly technical language. Its most famous text is Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi 
(“Thought-Jewel of Reality”) that deals with questions spanning logic, set theory, and 
epistemology.  
 
Navya-Nyāya is concerned with describing the cognition of concern to the logician and its 
expression in language [18]. The cognition is supposed to be based on three facts: (i) two acts 
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cannot be simultaneous; (ii) if introspection is to be possible, then the introspective act must 
follow immediately upon the object act, that is must not be more than one jump behind; (iii) 
the succeeding act constantly chases the preceding act. In other words, there is an attempt to 
analyze the very act of logical analysis.  
 
The Nyāya technical language is not as elegant as a pure symbolic language and to process its 
claims is tedious [19][20]. In principle, this language can be converted into a symbolic form. The 
syntax of the language consists of relational abstract expressions, different kinds of term 
expressions —primitive, relational, abstract, and negative— and a negation particle. 
 
A property with an empty domain was taken to be fictitious or unreal and non-negatable. 
Negation was considered a valid operation only on real properties. This could be considered to 
generate a three-valued table. If P, N, and U represent “positive”, “negative”, and 
“unnegatable”, then we have the truth table [21]: 
 
w not-w 
P N 
N P 
U U  
 
Knowledge was taken to be analyzed into three kinds of epistemological entities in their 
interrelations: “qualifier” (prakāra); “qualificand”, or that which must be qualified (viśeṣya); and 
“relatedness” (saṃsarga). For each of these there was a corresponding abstract entity. Various 
relations were introduced, such as direct and indirect temporal relations, paryāpti relation (in 
which a property resides in sets rather than in individual members of those sets), svarūpa 
relation (which holds, for example, between an absence and its locus), and relation between 
the cognition of a knowledge and its object. 
 
The concept of “limiterness" was used to put limits on time, property, and relations. The notion 
of negation was developed beyond specifying it with references to its limiting counterpositive, 
limiting relation, and limiting locus. The power of the technical language becomes clear when it 
is noted that questions such as the following were asked: Is one to recognize, as a significant 
negation, the absence of a thing A so that the limiter of the counterpositive A is not A-ness but 
B-ness? Gaṅgeśa said that the answer to these three questions was in the negative but he 
thought that the absence of an absence itself could lead to a new property suggesting 
consideration of higher abstractions.   
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According to Chakrabarti [19], Navya Nyāya anticipated several aspects of modern set theory.  
He explains:  
As an example Udayana says that there can be no universal of which every universal is a 
member; for if we had any such universal, then, by hypothesis, we have got a given totality of all 
universals that exist and all of them belong to this big universal. But this universal is itself a 
universal and hence (since it cannot be a member of itself, because in Udayana's view no 
universal can be a member of itself) this universal too along with other universals must belong 
to a bigger universal and so on ad infinitum. What Udayana says here has interesting analogues 
in modern set theory in which it is held that a set of all sets (i.e., a set to which every set 
belongs) does not exist. [19] 
 
An overall summary is provided by Staal [22], “The representation of logical structures by 
means of Sanskrit expressions in Indian logic constitutes a formalization which is similar to the 
formalization adopted by Western symbolic logic. The various technical terms, the formation of 
compounds, the morphological means of expression (e.g. suffixes and case endings) and the 
syntactical means of expression (e.g. appositional clauses) in the technical Sanskrit of Navya-
Nyāya are analogous to the terms, the formulas and the rules of modern Western logic.” 
 
In passing, we must add that Nyāya complements other approaches to reality through 
consideration of physical entities and the interaction of the observer and the observed 
[23][24][25], that have much affinity with quantum logics [26][27]. In the Indian physics 
tradition of Vaiśeṣika, the interaction between matter and mind was viewed through the idea of 
samavāya [28], which opens up several points of conceptual overlap with post-classical 
conceptions of reality (e.g. [23][29]).  This is relevant here because of Boole’s claim quoted 
above for he believed that intellectual processes constitute a “sphere of thought from which all 
limits are withdrawn.” This willingness to confront “infinity” shows up in the details of Boole’s 
algebra as described next. 
 
Boole's Interpretation Procedure  
Boole considered his algebraic methods for doing logic to be sound so long as he could 
interpret the end formula correctly. However, the expressions in the derivation had terms that 
could not have the usual meaning associated with the variables. For example, what does the 
equation xw = y mean about the class w? Boole solves this equation for w, obtaining w=y/x, and 
then expands it out.  
 
In order to show how it was done, he took the algebraic function f(x) to be given by what he 
called the Expansion Theorem [30]: 
 
 f(x) =  f(1) x + f(0) (1-x)       (11) 
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He claimed this was an identity by taking f(x) = a x + b (1-x), where a and b can be computed by 
putting x=0 and x=1, respectively by what he called the Elimination Theorem [31]. Using x’ as 
abbreviation for (1-x), he now wrote 
 
 f(x,y) = f(1,1) xy + f(1,0) xy’ + f(0,1) x’y + f(0,0) x’y’    (12) 
 
Thus if f(x,y) = y/x, he wrote this out without worrying about division by zero: 
 
 y/x = 1. xy + 0. xy’ + 0/0 x y + 1/0 x’y      (13) 
 
 
The term 0/0 contributes an indeterminate component to y/x as shown for v can be any subset 
of x’y’ and the 1/0 term is to be solved separately by the side-condition that x’y = 0. 
 
 
 Figure 3. Division of the universe into 3 classes, where v is indeterminate 
 
 
This keeps open the possibility that there are unknown other sets that can be part of the 
inference. The fact that an additional set outside of x and y could be associated with the 
problem must have been a point of attraction to Boole, although it does not provide any 
benefits and muddies up the analysis. 
 
Perhaps the logic of going beyond x and y and consideration of the indeterminate component 
paralleled the idea of catuṣkoṭi, which has long been part of Indian logic. It has four 
components:  P stands for any proposition and Not-P stands for its complement; both P and 
Not-P represents the usual universe; but the fourth part here is neither P not Not-P. The fourth 
part represents going beyond the domain of P and Not-P. 
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Discussion 
This article suggests explanations for George Boole’s development of his algebra for logic and 
the origins of its inadequacies. We have suggested broad parallels between his ideas and 
certain aspects of Indian logic that support his wife Mary Boole’s assertion that he was deeply 
influenced by Indian logic. We argue that Boole’s focus was more than a framework for 
propositions and that he was trying to mathematize cognitions as in the tradition of Indian logic 
and this is consistent with his own assertion that laws of thought should not be constrained by 
finitude. This may explain why he was happy to use operations in his algebra that allowed 
division by zero, which required further side-rules to eliminate infinities so that the final results 
were correct.  
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